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1Introduction: The China Challenge 
 The United States military is currently carrying out a transformation in its war fighting 
strategy aimed at countering threats to America and maintaining a long term balance of power.  
As the lone superpower in the world, the United States seeks to secure its global supremacy by 
dealing with threats to the status quo in all regions of the world.  In recent years, the major target 
of this transformation has been the rise of China, an event that could destabilize both the East 
Asian balance of power and the global one.  The China challenge extends from the Korean 
peninsula to the west coast of Burma, including crucial sea lanes, choke points, and the Malacca 
Strait.  The U.S. military cannot be in all places at the same time should a crisis arise, and so it 
has undertaken steps to transform into a rapidly deployable force.  While the United States wants 
“a confident and prosperous China that can play a constructive role in the world,” there is a 
prevailing view that China may seek to displace American hegemony in the region should the 
U.S. make the opportunity available.1 However, “if the United States does what it can and 
should do--if it strengthens its regional military presence and continues to modernize its forces--
it can maintain its maritime dominance, its deterrent capability, the regional balance of power 
and U.S. security.”2
Currently, military planners have set a target deployment goal of “a brigade combat team 
anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five 
divisions in theater in 30 days.”3 This goal, however, still remains outside of U.S. current 
capabilities, and so the military must rely on creating a forward presence in critical regions like 
East Asia.  Part one of this thesis will deal with how the United States is currently transforming 
 
1 Evans Revere, acting Secretary of for East Asian and Pacific affairs, as quoted in “U.S. Seeks to Strengthen its 
Partnerships in Asia-Pacific Region,” States News Service, May 18, 2005. 
2 Robert S. Ross, “Assessing the China Threat,” The National Interest, Fall 2005 
3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Concept for the Objective Force, Washington, D.C.: White Paper with 
foreword by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, November 2001, p. 9. 
2its military, both in terms of war fighting strategy on the ground and positioning at sea.  Though 
it is unlikely that the U.S. will engage China on the mainland, the possibility of American troop 
deployment to such areas as the Taiwan Strait and various islands in the South China Sea 
increasingly contributes to the importance of reshaping the force structure and deployment 
strategies of the military. 
 The second part of this paper will examine how unilateral forward positioning 
deployments, both on land and at sea in East Asia, helps to create a force structure that can 
respond to short-warning crises that may arise while continuing to secure American maritime 
dominance.  In addition, the adoption of a strategically flexible force within the region will allow 
the U.S. to deploy troops stationed on foreign soil to virtually any conflict that threatens the 
region’s stability.  Antiquated methods of deployment, as illustrated in Operation Desert Storm, 
have proved to be ineffective when dealing with both current and future threats that the military 
will encounter.  One of the greatest tests to transformation will be the ability to position our 
forces in a way that both deters China from taking any aggressive action but can also respond 
rapidly and appropriately should conflict occur.  The rise of China is now a major priority for the 
Department of Defense and the most recent QDR has specifically noted that one goal of the 2007 
fiscal year is “to help shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, strengthen 
deterrence, and hedge against future strategic uncertainty.”4
As the U.S. transforms its military, it will rely on increased levels of commitment and 
cooperation from its regional allies; Part three will examine America’s alliances in East Asia that 
continue to improve under the current situation, including the state of America’s greatest 
strategic asset in the region, the U.S.-Japan alliance, as well as what the United States is doing to 
 
4 Headquarters, Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C., February 6, 2006, 
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3improve its capabilities in Southeast Asia.  The rise of China is a pressing issue for Japan, 
Singapore, Philippines and Malaysia, and by allowing the U.S. increased access in this region, 
these countries can guarantee a continued U.S. presence to promote stability.  At the same time, 
the United States can fulfill its own security goals in deterring potentially aggressive China and 
honor its alliance commitments should conflict arise that concerns the interests of these states.  
When considering the effect of forward deployment on America’s alliances in regions of 
potential conflict, it is important to examine such factors as the length of time forward 
deployment will be necessary, the extent of troops and equipment prepositioned, and whether the 
time saved outweighs the political complications that may arise with the host nation.5
Finally, part four will look at the failing alliances in the region, the expectations that U.S. 
policymakers have of these states concerning transformation, and the resistance that each has 
shown.  America’s approach to dealing with the rise of China, while helping to bring the U.S. 
closer with many of its regional allies, has also called into question the future of some 
longstanding alliances in the region, specifically with South Korea and Australia.  This section 
will also examine how the United States has dealt with the deterioration of these alliances in 
terms of strengthening its alliances elsewhere in the region.  The paper will conclude with an 
analysis of how the overall transformation process has contributed to a fundamental change of 
the American footprint in East Asia. 
 
5 Eric Peltz, John M. Halliday, and Aimee Bower, Speed and Power: Toward and Expeditionary Army, Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1755, 2003, pg. 41-42. 
4Part I: Military Transformation 
 A major transformation of the United States military and its war-fighting strategies is 
now underway, centered on a two-pronged approach to improve both the capabilities and 
deployability of forces.  In order to respond more rapidly to short-warning crises, the military 
must reorganize its force structure to allow for rapid deployment.  This, in turn, will require the 
army to change the way it deploys its forces, calling upon forward deployment and 
prepositioning to make up for the shortcomings of more traditional deployment models.  
Transformation is more than physically modifying the makeup of U.S. forces; it is a shift in 
doctrine that reflects the future of U.S. military operations. 
 The Army transformation is a complete process that deals with “every aspect of its 
doctrine, training, organization, and equipment.”6 At the core of this move is the emerging 
doctrine of “full spectrum dominance” as laid out in Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020).  In response to 
America’s continued presence as a global superpower and a wide variety of emerging threats that 
challenge this position, the armed forces are taking steps towards creating a force that is “able to 
conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to 
specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains – space, sea, land, 
air, and information.”7 While JV 2020 is intended to be the framework for a total revolution in 
American military affairs, it has laid the groundwork for the transformation of the Army from the 
current Legacy Force to the Objective Force. 
 The Army has adopted two of the central concepts from JV 2020: dominant maneuver 
and precision engagement.  A force capable of dominant maneuver, which is the motivation 
 
6 Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, and Seth Jones. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic 
Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1606, 2002, p. 4. 
7 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Vision 2020, Washington, D.C.: J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy, June 
2000, p. 8. 
5behind the move to a brigade-based army, “will possess unmatched speed and agility in 
positioning and repositioning tailored forces from widely dispersed locations to achieve 
operational objectives quickly and decisively.”8 The current system, organized by divisions 
(ranging from approximately 10,000 to 18,000 troops) consisting of three smaller brigades, 
introduces an extra level of command that has made it more difficult for in-field commanders to 
control combat situations.  A transformation to the smaller brigades, which vary from 5,000 to 
6,000 in strength, is aided by modern technologies, which “could provide the same—or more—
combat power as current divisions.”9 Precision engagement, defined as “the ability to locate and 
track targets, to engage targets with appropriate systems, and to achieve the desired effects,”10 is 
essential to the Army’s new vision and its reliance on superior technology to link the new, 
smaller brigades on the battlefield.   
 The Army, having incorporated the elements of JV 2020, has simplified this doctrine to a 
central ideal: “the side that achieves a decisive operational capability first seizes the initiative.”11 
With this in mind, the ultimate goal of the Army is the Objective Force, which improves upon 
the Legacy force in the following characteristics: responsiveness, deployability, agility, 
versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.  The Army has clearly demonstrated its 
concern over response time/deployability.  To develop a rapid deployment force, it has set the 
goal “to deploy a brigade combat team anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff, a division 
on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in theater in 30 days.”12 
8 CJCS, JV 2020, p. 26. 
9 John R. Brinkerhoff, “The Brigade-Based New Army,” Parameters U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Autumn 
1997, pp. 61-62. 
10 Vick, et. al., The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment 
Options, p. 5. 
11 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, Washington, D.C., June 14, 2001, 
paragraph 3-43. 
12 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Concept for the Objective Force, Washington, D.C.: White paper with 
foreword by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, November 2001, p. 9. 
6A more agile and versatile force will eliminate the need to separate divisions to handle 
the assortment of missions that face U.S. forces, and instead would allow single units to handle a 
variety of operations from support and stability to actual war fighting.  To be truly agile, units 
must be both flexible and mobile, a characteristic that we find in the brigade-based army.  
Survivability is linked to the Army’s “need for speed,” and “by seizing the initiative and seeing, 
understanding, and acting first, the Objective Force will enhance its own survivability through 
action an its retention of the initiative.”13 Finally, the Objective Force’s ability to sustain itself in 
the field deals with the Army’s attempt to decrease it’s logistical or combat footprint.  Improving 
the reliability of equipment will allow in-field units to decrease their dependency on having to 
constantly re-supply;14 however, “while reliability can and should be substantially improved, the 
Army probably cannot reach its objective force sustainability goals solely by increasing 
reliability.”15 There are four possible levers to advance sustainability: reliability (“affects a 
force’s ability to accomplish missions”), maintainability (“encompasses factors that affect the 
resources and time needed to complete repairs”), fleet cycle life management (“how the Army 
will handle degradation from system aging and how it will design the system to accommodate 
upgrades”), and supply support (“requirements reflect supply chain decisions”).16 
A Brigade-Based Army:  
 The United States Military has currently entered into a new stage of its transformation 
process, which attempts to correct the problems illustrated of Operation Desert Storm.  The 
Current or Legacy Force is characterized by the two components of heavy and light forces, but 
 
13 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Concept for the Objective Force, p. 14. 
14 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Concept for the Objective Force, p. 10-15. 
15 Eric Peltz, Improved Equipment Sustainment is Critical to Army Transformation, Arroyo Center Research Brief, 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, RB-3039-A, 2003, p. 1. 
16 Peltz, Improved Equipment Sustainment is Critical to Army Transformation, p. 2. 
7there is a substantial gap between the capabilities of each.  While heavy forces are equipped to 
provide the Army with a dominant stopping power against a variety of enemy forces, they are 
difficult to strategically deploy; in contrast, the light forces are well suited for rapid response but 
are inadequate against an enemy’s heavy mechanized forces.  In light of the problems associated 
with the Current Force, former Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki noted that, “Our 
forces must be capable of building sustained momentum in spite of the gap between those two 
operational capabilities. What we require is greater lethality, survivability and deployability all 
across the force.”17 
The Army’s answer to this problem is the brigade-based system, which military planners 
hope will improve upon two elements of deployment and force projection: “the combat 
footprint” and deployment time.  The Army Research Division at RAND’s Arroyo Center has 
noted that in addition to deployment time, “the other goal is to reduce the CSS ‘footprint’—the 
men and material needed to support combat forces—in the combat zone to improve both 
deployment speed and maneuver force mobility.”18 As early as 1997, the Army began to consider 
the transformation to a brigade-based system as a stepping stone towards Force XXI.19 In doing 
so, strategists have predicted a variety of advantages that will result from this move, such as the 
simplification of command and control through the elimination of field command layers, the 
 
17 General Eric Shinseki, “The Army Transformation: A Historic Opportunity,” Army Magazine, October 2000, p. 
23. 
18 RAND Arroyo Center, Annual Report 2002, p. 28. 
19 Force XXI is generally considered the ultimate goal of the Army in terms of linking ground units virtually to 
create a force that uses technological superiority to exploit enemy units.  In its simplest definition, “the multiyear 
Force XXI design effort was the first to invent and embody for those fighting units a linked, instantaneous, and 
common picture and awareness of the close and distant events of the unfolding battle of which they were part. 
"Digitization" was the rubric given this revolutionary emerging capability.” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/force-xxi.htm
8improvement of the mixing of combat forces,20 a better integration of active and reserve 
components, and the ability to accommodate any required changes in force structure.21 
A transformation to a brigade-based army could create significant changes to American 
warfare strategy that could revolutionize the Army and military affairs in general.  First, the use 
of brigade teams would allow the army to revise its antiquated system of artillery support by 
having the brigades provide mutual fire support for each other.  Rather than the classic linear 
arrangement of firepower positioned in the rear, artillery could be assigned to mobile brigades 
that could provide support for forward units and allow the army to employ newer, more 
technologically advanced weapons systems.  Second, brigades are faster and more flexible than 
the current division formations, and with a more mobile artillery system, “brigades could move 
as coherent fighting forces in a nonlinear and noncontiguous manner.”22 
A third possible benefit would be the ability of the Army to critically examine many of its 
logistical shortcomings.  Brinkerhoff suggests that areas that deserve a closer look include the 
relationship between artillery and the units it must support, the composition of brigades, and a 
review of why past attempts at a more mobile fighting force have failed.  Finally, a brigade-
based system would allow for a more flexible management of force structure.  A force comprised 
of brigades could be expanded or reduced more efficiently than larger divisions.23 
Lessons Learned- Problems and Solution from Operation Desert Shield/Storm: 
 
20 “Moving down to the brigade level would allow the Army to retain adequate amounts of these specialized 
capabilities (airborne, air assault, light infantry) in smaller packages.  It would not be necessary to maintain an entire 
airborne division to have a parachute assault capability that can be provided by one separate airborne brigade.” 
Brinkerhoff, “The Brigade-Based New Army”, p. 68. 
21 Brinkerhoff, “The Brigade-Based New Army”, pp. 67-68. 
22 Brinkerhoff, “The Brigade-Based New Army”, pp. 70. 
23 Brinkerhoff, “The Brigade-Based New Army”, pp. 70-71. 
9The current school of thought regarding military transformation and deployment is a 
direct result of lessons learned in the first Gulf War.  David Kassing notes that, “The deployment 
of U.S. forces to the Middle East in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (ODS) 
has focused attention on the deployability of U.S. military power.”24 The growing need for a 
rapidly deployable force is a testament to the shortcomings that American forces have 
experienced with their past deployment capabilities.  Airlift, sealift, and prepositioning, the three 
major modes of American deployment, were all strenuously tested during Operation Desert 
Storm/Desert Shield and neither could individually provide adequate deployment.   To put it 
rather succinctly, “sealift could deliver the punch, but did not have the speed to get to the crisis 
area early. Airlift could provide the speed, but could not move heavy forces. Storing heavy 
equipment in the region helped.”25 The success of operations as a whole tends to overshadow the 
significant faults that were revealed upon review of ODS.  In many ways, the conditions for 
deployment in ODS were more favorable than can be expected in the conflicts which the U.S. 
will most likely face in the future.  For this reason, and “to improve its strategic responsiveness, 
the Army is improving its ability to rapidly deploy to austere fighting environments, fight on 
arrival throughout the battlespace, and sustain operations until victorious.”26 
On its surface, American deployment during the Gulf War seemed successful, and to 
some extent, it was, as U.S. forces scored overwhelming military victories.  A deeper look, 
however, reveals that these outcomes can be misleading.  American deployment benefited 
greatly from a series of factors: unopposed deployment, spacious sea and airports, local fuel 
 
24 David Kassing, Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert: An Annotated Briefing, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, N-
3508-AF/A/OSD, 1992, p. 1. 
25 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the 
Gulf, (Little, Brown and Company: Boston 1995), p. 57. 
26 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005 Army Modernization Plan, Washington, D.C.: February 2005, p. 29, 
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sources, and a five month window of deployment.27 In spite of these advantages, U.S. forces 
were not fully deployed and operational for approximately 165 days after the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. Initial deployment, carried out in the first 90 days, accounted for a “substantial deterrent 
and defensive force” for the protection of Saudi Arabia.  The second phase, which took place 
over the next 75 days, provided the offensive force necessary to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait 
as well as a considerable amount of support units and supplies.28 
American strategists employed an area-defense concept, which “focused on defending 
key areas given the limited forces available.”29 The necessity of a credible deterrent force meant 
initial deployments would have to get substantial units to the region in a timely fashion, “but 
available sealift meant the buildup of heavy ground forces would take several weeks, if not 
months.”30 What resulted was a “window of vulnerability,” since “shortages of sufficient fast 
sealift with a roll-on/roll-off capability so crucial to loading and unloading armored equipment 
rapidly meant that heavy forces would deploy incrementally.”31 Despite the overall success of 
ODS, each mode of deployment had its shortcomings, which would become the basis for the call 
for a significant transformation of the Army. 
 The U.S. military used a three pronged system for delivering troops and equipment to the 
regions of conflict; airlift, sealift, and prepositioning.  Operation Desert Storm/Shield provided 
some key insight into the efficiency of each method, as well as its shortcomings, and “marked 
the first major strategic deployment of combat units by air.”32 While the Final Report to 
Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War stated, “rapid buildup of initial forces during 
 
27 Kassing, Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert, p. 7. 
28 Kassing, Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert, p. 11. 
29 Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992, p. 77 
30 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 78  
31 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 81  
32 John Lund, Ruth Berg, and Corinne Replogle, An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency, Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, R-4269/4-AF, 1993,  p. xiii 
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these crucial days would have been impossible without strategic airlift,” further assessment has 
noted that, “their great expense makes them impractical for delivering more than a small portion 
of cargo in a large-scale deployment.”33 
Despite limited success, the airlift deployment during ODS failed on a number of levels.  
In the critical moments following the President’s decision to deploy troops, a “lack of stable, 
reliable requirement in the first weeks of the operation made it impossible to make efficient use 
of an airlift fleet.”34 Further problems included mechanic failure, personnel shortages, and poor 
planning by those outside the Mobile Airlift Command (MAC), leaving airlift performance short 
of projected totals.  In terms of short tons per day delivered, airlift performed below both the 
most optimistic projections and the Military Airlift Command’s (MAC) adjusted projections.35 
The presence of above average conditions and the subsequent inability of airlift coordinators to 
utilize this to their advantage calls into question the future of airlift in American operations.  
RAND’s assessment of ODS airlift noted that “the need to respond to rapidly evolving 
operational situations in the theater, albeit essential, meant that the airlift system performed at 
less that its theoretical optimum.”36 With such critical factors working against the successfulness 
of airlift, it is vital to consider ways to modify this essential method of deployment. 
 Airlift modernization has become a significant issue among Congressional leaders and 
military planners as the transport fleet continues to become outdated. Since the Gulf War, “the 
United States has reduced its Cold War infrastructure and closed two thirds of its forward 
 
33 Congressional Budget Office, Moving U.S. Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility, February 1997, Section 2 
34 Lund, et al., An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency, p. 74. 
35 “An early MAC estimate, allowing for only the first stage of CRAF and reserve volunteers, indicated that about 
2,800 tons per day might be delivered.  In fact, airlift delivered an average of 2,300 tons per day during the first 54 
days of the Phase I deployments.” Kassing, Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert, p. 26 
36 Lund, et. al., An Assessment of Strategic Airlift Operational Efficiency, p. 74. 
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bases.”37 This has placed tremendous strain on the airlift structure, precisely because forces must 
now be strategically deployed over greater distances.  The Air Force, as of 2005, has proposed 
five means to modernize strategic airlift; modernize C-5’s and purchase additional C-17’s, 
increased use of commercial aircraft, pursue airships and hybrid airships, reduce the airlift 
requirement, or accept less strategic airlift capability.  It is clear that airlift will remain an option 
for the military, at least for the near future, as planning has already begun for its role in 
deploying the next wave of military force structure, the brigade combat teams. 
 Sealift, in contrast, is a more complex transport structure than airlift, and so it must be 
looked at both on its separate levels and as a collective unit.  Overall, “the Department of 
Defense used sealift ships to move more than 70 percent of all dry cargo during the Persian Gulf 
War, but those ships took three to four weeks to travel from the United States.”38 Sealift can be 
divided into four separate tiers of shipping which are differentiated based on the speed of their 
first deliveries.  Prepositioning is naturally the fastest mode of sealift, but can be considered as a 
separate mode of deployment altogether.  The other three consist of Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), 
Ready Reserve Force (RRF), and in some instances, commercial ships chartered by DoD.    
 As early as 1992, in RAND’s assessment of Operation Desert Shield/Storm deployment, 
it was conceded that the favorable conditions present during the conflict would not be as likely in 
later conflicts.  It is for this reason that rapid deployment and forward positioning have become 
so vital to future military success.  Following the end of the Cold War, significant changes in 
military force structure have ushered out heavy forces and replaced them with light, rapidly 
deployable units.  During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, prepositioning was crucial in 
establishing a sufficient force within the theatre as early as possible.  The U.S. had Maritime 
 
37 Christopher Bolkcom, CRS Report for Congress, Strategic Airlift Modernization: Background, Issues, and 
Options, March 25, 2005, CRS-1 
38 Moving U.S. Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility, Section 2 
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Prepositioning Squadrons at Diego Garcia and Guam, while, “two carrier battle groups with 
more than 100 fighter and attack aircraft, and more than 10 surface combatant ships were 
directed to the Gulf Region on 2 August.”39 In addition, the Afloat Prepositioning Force, 
responsible for storing supplies for the Army, Navy and, Air Force performed exceptionally well, 
meeting planned expectations.  According to RAND’s analysis of Gulf War Deployment, the 
Afloat Prepositioning Force arrived without incident within 11 days of being called into action.  
The MPS performed on a similar level, though slightly under expectations in terms of time and 
maintenance.40 
A Stronger Case for Prepositioning/Forward Deployment: 
 The ambitious goal set forth by General Shinseki “to deploy a brigade combat team 
anywhere in the world in 96 hours” seems unattainable with basing solely in the United States 
and budget constraints.  In light of this, military planners have paid closer attention to the 
possibility of a greater reliance on prepositioning (equipment) and forward deployment (troops) 
through the use of regional U.S. bases and cooperation from allies.  In their analysis of the 
Army’s effort to develop a faster fighting force that can be rapidly deployed, Peltz, Halliday, and 
Bower note that when determining the most plausible locations for what they call forward unit 
positioning, “the decision process should start with a review of regions where fast-response 
capability is desired.”41 This method would prove especially beneficial in East Asia, where the 
United States is currently meeting the rise of China by continuing to restructure its forces and 
strengthen its capabilities in the region.  With the China challenging covering such a large area 
(from the Korean peninsula to the west coast of Burma, including crucial sea lanes, choke points, 
 
39 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p. 79  
40 Kassing, Getting U.S. Military Power to the Desert, p. 27-29 
41 Peltz, et. al., Speed and Power: Toward and Expeditionary Army, p. 41. 
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and the Malacca Strait), it becomes more difficult for the U.S. military to be everywhere at the 
same time.  The Army, in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force, will play an important role 
in deterring China, as it “ensures critical access is available when needed through forward-
deployed forces, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime security cooperation initiatives, and, 
when called, through force projection from the CONUS or any other location where needed 
capabilities reside.”42 
There are three basic forms of prepositioning that deal with a region of high priority.  In 
the first case, the United States could rely on its regional allies to allow for prepositioning of 
troops and equipment in areas located in close proximity to possible sites of conflict.  This is not 
a new concept, with examples including, “heavy brigade sets in Kuwait that were prepositioned 
in response to the Iraqi threat, sets prepositioned in Germany during the Cold War, and 
equipment sets in South Korea.” What makes this idea so attractive at this stage in American 
military affairs is the emphasis that has been placed on the need for rapid deployment, and the 
considerable increase in importance of certain regions (specifically East Asia, and to some 
extent, the Middle East).  The other two forms of prepositioning center around the 
implementation of a “theater-oriented” system, with equipment or troops prepositioned on ships 
in the region or in nearby countries, which would then be transported throughout the region by 
ships. 43 
42 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Concept for the Objective Force, Washington, D.C.: White paper with 
foreword by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, November 2001, p. 9. 
43 Peltz, et. al., Speed and Power: Toward and Expeditionary Army, p. 47. 
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44 
To effectively implement a system of prepositioning, the Army must modify its current 
protocol to maximize speed and efficiency.  In the past, prepositioning guidelines mandated 
administrative loading (loading done to maximize space without tactical consideration), a lack of 
urgency for moving early in response to threats, dated equipment, a single force type (fixed 
application) and the prepositioning of full units.  With an emphasis on rapid deployment, these 
characteristics must be changed.  First, as mentioned in the discussion of airlift loading, the new, 
restructured brigades would be able to deploy faster if operational/mission loading (equipment 
loaded so as to be ready for use immediately) was utilized.  Second, the development of a 
strategic warning system would allow the movement of prepositioned equipment to begin prior 
to the full outbreak of conflict.  A third step which must be carried out with the utmost priority is 
the modernization of prepositioned equipment, which is a given in the context of the 
transformation overhaul that the Army is undergoing.  In addition, ships used for prepositioning 
are capable of supporting different forces, and this should be exploited by forward deploying 
multiple unit types.  Finally, the question of cost is certainly on the minds of military planners.  
 
44 Peltz, et. al., Speed and Power: Toward and Expeditionary Army, p. 48. 
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By limiting forward deployment to select equipment rather than full units, cost can be 
substantially cut.45 
Future Considerations: 
 Inevitably, there will be some obstacles in the way of this transformation process and 
many of the initiatives will fall short of their projected goals.  At this point, the 96 hour deadline 
for brigade deployment continues to be outside the reach of military planners, and even calls into 
question the viability for such a rapid response time.  Retired Lt. Col. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. 
point out that while a rapidly deployable expeditionary force is essential to the future success of 
the Army, it [the Army], “must make difficult tradeoffs in its design parameters (force lethality, 
mobility, and sustainability) to meet these extremely demanding and seemingly arbitrary 
deployment timelines.”46 
A second obstacle can be seen in the urban warfare currently being fought in Iraq, which 
has demonstrated the problems that arise when the impact of American air superiority is reduced, 
emphasizing the necessity for precise and advanced intelligence gathering.  The vision for the 
new brigades and eventually the Objective Force, which centers around the ability of U.S. forces 
to “see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively” is intended to improve American 
capabilities in scenarios where “it seems likely that the local inhabitants or occupying forces will 
have a better picture of the environment than Army forces which arrive after the fact.”47 This 
will place an even greater burden on military planners to plan for such missions when finalizing 
the brigade teams.  To date, the army seems ready and willing to accept this challenge in 
 
45 Peltz, et. al., Speed and Power: Toward and Expeditionary Army, pg. 47-51. 
46 Lt. Col. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Land Warfare: Transforming the Legions, Joint Force 
Quarterly, Autumn 2002, p. 80. 
47 Krepinevich, The Army and Land Warfare: Transforming the Legions, p. 81. 
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developing brigades that will be able to sustain themselves in both long term operations and 
irregular warfare.48 
Military transformation is a complex process, but a necessary one if the United States is 
to maintain its prominent position in the international security structure.  The evolving nature of 
threats to America’s security challenges military planners to rethink the way we fight wars.  
Drawing upon the lessons of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, it is clear that a transition to 
a rapidly deployable force is a necessity, given the high probability of short warning conflicts. 
 Staging this rapidly deployable force within the continental United States no longer 
seems practical, and the strong case for prepositioning cannot be ignored.  The issue at hand is 
how this will affect America’s relationships with its allies who will be called upon to house U.S. 
troops and equipment in regions of likely conflict.  No region demonstrates this problem quite 
like East Asia, where uncertainty concerning the rise of China stands to threaten the overall 
stability of the region as well as America’s position there.  How regional actors balance the rise 
of China and increasing demands from American leaders will have a direct effect on U.S. 
military planning in the region. 
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Part II: Unilateral Deployments and East Asia 
 The United States Military, and specifically the Navy, have begun a series of unilateral 
deployments and transformations with an eye on increasing their power projection capabilities in 
East Asia and responding to the rise of China.  As pointed out in a Congressional Budget Office 
Report on fleet modernization, “above all others, the specific potential threat that concerns much 
of the Navy’s leadership and many Members of Congress is a new naval competition with the 
People’s Republic of China.”49 Navy Sea Power 21, the conceptual framework for this 
transformation, consists of three major components: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  
This transformation is aimed at improving the “ability of naval forces to project precise and 
persistent offensive power from the sea…defend themselves at sea…and operate at sea, as 
sovereign entities free from concerns of access and political constraints associated with using 
land bases in other countries.”50 Sea Basing will further allow the military to launch 
expeditionary operations and utilize more rapidly deployable forces (i.e. the new brigades) in 
regions of conflict, though Navy officials do not expect this to become a viable option for 
another thirty years. 
 In the near future, the Navy plans on a fleet modernization that “would be organized 
around 11 carrier strike groups (one less than now exists), nine expeditionary strike groups (two 
less than in the current fleet), nine surface action groups, and four SSGN strike groups.”51 The 
overall size of the fleet is to be reduced from 375 ships to a smaller, but more capable 290 ships 
fleet, with the argument behind it that capabilities are more important sheer numbers.  Under this 
transformation, a more advanced system of weapons programs is expected to be launched.  
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Leading this development surge is a new class of Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carriers (CVN-21), 
designed to replace the current Nimitz class as they move into retirement.  The CVN-21, which 
is not expected to begin construction until 2008, will provide the Navy with more capable 
carriers and aircraft deployment, but raises significant questions about both cost and size.  Many 
critics doubt that this will be feasible in terms of the overall budget for the program as well as 
whether such massive ships will be able to perform in the types of future combat scenarios that 
are currently being envisioned.52 
A second initiative being undertaken by the Navy is the Trident Submarine Conversion 
(SSGN) program, which converts Ohio class nuclear submarines (first commissioned in 1981) 
into “cruise-missile-carrying and special operations forces (SOF) support submarines.”  Each 
submarine would be capable of carrying up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and 66 SEAL team 
members, and would use existing launch tubes to deliver both its arsenal and deploy SEAL 
personnel through the Advanced SEAL Delivery System.  As the Navy continues to produce 
these submarines, the question of basing becomes important.  As early as the 2001 QDR, it was 
suggested that the Pacific theatre was the appropriate place to base these subs, and more 
specifically, at U.S. facilities in Guam.  The SSGN program highlights some major components 
of the current transformation procedure, representing a “conversion of a strategic-nuclear force 
platform into a non-strategic platform” while combining stealth with the capability of carrying a 
significantly larger number of cruise missiles and delivering a larger payload volume.53 
In addition to the modernization of the fleet, the Navy is also seeking to restructure naval 
formations and deployment options.  Currently, the Navy is organized around “aircraft carrier 
battle groups and Amphibious Ready Groups,” but such a system is no longer considered 
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feasible for the flexibility necessary to deploy to multiple regions at the same time.  In response 
to this, the Navy has begun to implement a Global Concept of Operations, which “reorganizes 
the Navy into a larger number of independently deployable, strike-capable formations.”  At the 
center of this transformation are the SSGN submarines which have been assigned to the new 
surface strike groups (SSGs) and can independently carry out operations.  
 A major element of this fleet transformation and military transformation in general, is the 
emphasis that is being placed on flexibility.  The Navy, which currently uses a six-month 
forward deployment schedule, has begun to implement changes that make this schedule more 
flexible.  By working in changes to the system concerning deployment length and rotational 
deployment schedule, the Navy hopes to deals with the criticism that “maintaining the standard 
six-month deployments resulted in a fleet that offered insufficient flexibility for responding to 
the potential need for surging large numbers of naval forces in a short time to respond to major 
regional contingencies.”54 A combination of more flexible deployment schedules and 
prepositioned forces, while not officially designated as such, seems to be specifically tailored 
towards dealing with the rise of China.  At present, “a carrier strike group and an expeditionary 
strike group are based permanently in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan, respectively” and “the Navy 
has studied options for basing six more submarines and a squadron of cruisers and destroyers in 
Guam,” with an additional carrier home-ported in San Diego. 55 Presently, Guam’s Apra Harbor 
is the home to two Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarines.56 Though the 
importance of the region has required defense planners to relocate forces and equipment, such a 
transformation is challenged by the vulnerability of prepositioned forces and the dispersion of 
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troops to reduce that vulnerability.  It is here that we see the need for greater cooperation with 
our allies as “the pentagon plans to minimize presence, reduce large overseas bases and keep 
military assets away from hotspots to reduce ‘exposure to asymmetric threats’ while advancing 
joint operations and sharing roles with allies.”57 
The Importance of Guam: 
 With American military strategists carrying out a program of unilateral deployments in 
East Asia, perhaps their greatest asset lies on the U.S. territory of Guam, which “offers the U.S. 
military both proximity to potential hot spots and the advantages of operating off U.S. soil.”58 
Though Guam has historically been a key staging area for U.S. troops (there is a major U.S. 
Navy port and Air Force base already on site), the current administration has advocated a major 
buildup on the small island.  Current estimates place an additional 8,000 Marines on Guam by 
2014 (transferred from Okinawa) and an overall troop increase nearing 20,000 within a decade, 
all in an attempt to make the island a forward deployment base for the U.S. in the Pacific.59 This 
forward deployment is a direct result of both the transformation to a rapidly deployable military 
and the growing concern over the rise of China.  Defense analyst Richard Halloran has noted that 
“The larger strategic rationale [for the shift] can be summed up in one word, and that's 
‘China.’”60 
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Guam’s continuing importance does not stop at forward deployment of troops.  In 
addition to the two currently based attack submarines, and with the possibility of adding up to six 
more, the Navy “also plans to refurbish wharves to accommodate aircraft carriers and to 
transform Guam into a base for its new Littoral Combat Ship (a shallow-draft stealth ship 
designed to operate close to shore) and [SSGN].”61 Such accommodation would serve as a 
temporary basing are for the carriers, as military personnel have decided against a permanent 
home-porting of aircraft carriers in Guam, opting instead for San Diego.  With an eye on future 
conflict with China, the U.S. continues to take steps to ensure naval dominance in the region.  To 
support this endeavor, military planners have also boosted the Air Force presence on Guam by 
relocating tanker planes, additional fighter planes, and unmanned spy planes which may replace 
the U2 spy planes that are currently based in South Korea.  In 2003, the U.S. ordered the 
deployment of 24 long range bombers to Guam in response to a possible crisis involving North 
Korea, and has implemented a plan for frequent rotations of B-2 strategic bombers on the 
island.62 The island is also the “first installation outside the continental United States to store 
3,000-pound conventional air-launched cruise missiles” at Anderson Air Force Base.63 The 
increased forward deployment on Guam serves to both re-assure our allies in Southeast Asia that 
our commitment to them and to balancing the rise of China is still strong and to position U.S. 
forces in a place where they can rapidly respond to short-warning conflicts.  As General Paul 
Hester has noted, “If you want to look for unobstructed operations that America may want to do, 
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there is no place that is deeper penetrating into the western Pacific, under an American flag, than 
in Guam.”64 
Finally, Guam is strategically located to cut down on response time, but still lies outside 
of China’s maritime power-projection capabilities. Still, the threat of Chinese missile capabilities 
is a concern for defense planners, who now seek to incorporate Guam into the U.S. missile 
defense system already in place in the region.  As the U.S. improves its own capabilities and 
infrastructure on Guam, and strengthens its own power-projection and deterrent capabilities in 
the region, the likelihood of China initiating conflict diminishes.  Given the number of sources of 
tension in East Asia, specifically the Taiwan Strait and North Korea, and the Spratly Islands in 
Southeast Asia, Guam “could certainly serve as an excellent patrol base and important inter-
theater staging base, and relatively secure rear area in event of a crisis or conflict, particularly 
one extending over a period of time.”65 
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Part III: The Role of Regional Alliances 
 Military transformation cannot be solely a unilateral endeavor on the part of the United 
States and a heavier emphasis will be placed on the cooperation of allies to assist U.S. forward 
deployment of personnel and equipment, particularly U.S allies in East Asia.  This shift in war-
fighting strategy makes it increasingly important for allies to accommodate the demands of the 
United States, but at the same, will foster a change in alliance relationships.  A rapidly 
deployable force, supported by equipment based overseas, will require allies to not only grant 
access to their ports and bases, but to maintain these facilities and be willing to provide war-time 
assistance to the U.S. in almost any way necessary.   
 The heavy demand of military transformation on alliance partners is affecting the way in 
which the United States restructures its security relationships in East Asia.  Transformation 
targets the capabilities of both the U.S. and its alliance partners, as well as the interoperability of 
the combined forces.  As James J. Przystup, a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic 
Studies at the National Defense University notes, “U.S.-led transformation should not be a threat 
to alliance solidarity. Done right, in fact, it will reinforce deterrence and strengthen the military 
effectiveness of the alliance in performing a range of vital tasks.” 66 While the United States and 
its allies may not always be aligned in their expectations of the alliance, a positive response to 
transformation can increase the burden sharing and bring about a more mutually beneficial 
relationship.  As the major power in each of these alliances, the United States, by insisting upon 
an increased level of cooperation as it transforms its force structure, seeks to bring about greater 
burden sharing for collective security within the alliance, while at the same time reinforcing its 
commitment to promoting stability in the region.  In doing so, the U.S. must call on its alliance 
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partners to contribute in ways that are most in line with their current capabilities, whether it is the 
commitment of forces to U.S. led operations or rear area and logistical support while the United 
States conducts operations elsewhere in the region. 
 As a result, the United States has strengthened its alliances with many states in the 
region, most notably Japan, Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia.  The U.S.-Japan alliance is the 
centerpiece of U.S. strategy in East Asia, as both countries are now pre-occupied with the rise of 
China.   
 
Japan: 
 America’s footprint in East Asia currently rests firmly in the U.S.-Japan alliance, which 
former United States Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has referred to as “our greatest 
strategic asset in the region.”67 Since the end of World War Two, the United States and Japan 
were close allies, working together to ensure stability in East Asia in the face of a common 
Soviet threat.  However, “once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet 
Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the 
bilateral alliance.”68 This post-Cold War drift led to a straining of relations that would be 
exposed during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which subsequently produced the 1996 U.S.-Japan 
Joint Security Declaration and the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.  In 
the October 2000 INSS Report (though unofficial, still quite relevant) on the alliance, Armitage 
proposed the foundation for improving the security cooperation which consisted of a 
reaffirmation of U.S. forces to defend Japan, a “diligent implementation of the revised 
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Guidelines,” and a decreased American force structure in Japan, based on capability rather than 
quantity.69 
In order to reduce the American military footprint in Japan, strategists had to reassess the 
use of Okinawa for forward basing and deployment.  Okinawa provided a strategic stronghold 
for American forces, “positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific 
Ocean—only about one hour’s flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.”70 
Unlike Guam, using Okinawa for basing and troop buildup is not without its political challenges, 
and the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement dealt with 
this issue by calling “for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on 
Okinawa.”71 The removal of forces from Okinawa was not necessarily a poor strategic move, but 
Armitage argued that the agreement should have explicitly called for the U.S. to diversify its 
forces and spread them across the region, stating “from a military perspective, it is important for 
U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region.”72 
The United States has been assertive in promoting its goals in East Asia of “opposing a 
dominant regional power, seeking free and open trade, and promoting democracy.”73 Armacost 
and Pyle note that “the forward deployment of 100,000 American troops in East Asia, the 
network of bases and alliances in the region, and the role of the Seventh Fleet in maintaining 
regional security give the U.S. engagement policy a far more assertive character [than 
Japan’s].”74 Japan’s proximity to China has influenced the way in which Japan participates in the 
security relationship with the United States.  As Armitage notes, “during most of its existence, 
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the U.S.-Japan security relationship operated under two fundamental principles: that the United 
States will defend Japan and the areas under its administration. And that Japan would provide 
bases and facilities for U.S. forces in country for the security of the Far East.” In recent years, 
Japanese leaders have been more willing to provide assistance to U.S. led operations outside the 
region, as evidenced by the deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense forces in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the reconstruction of Iraq.75 
In contrast to the state of the alliance in 2000, the U.S.-Japan security relationship is now 
moving in a direction of greater collaboration as Japan asserts itself more on regional and global 
matters.  The United States can now expect Japan to provide “for more of the areas required for 
its own defense” but at the same time, “the U.S. must view itself as an Asia-Pacific power and 
decide to take part in all aspects of life in Asia.” 76 Thus, AS Japan remains under the protection 
of the United States, recent trends in the alliance have allowed the U.S. an even greater presence 
in the region through Japan. 
 In 2008, the United States is scheduled to base a nuclear carrier in Japan for the first time, 
thereby increasing American capabilities and “allows the most rapid response times possible for 
maritime and joint forces, and brings our most capable ships with the greatest amount of striking 
power and operational capability to bear in the timeliest manner.”77 Logistically, American 
defense planners are working to integrate Japan into its Command, Control, Communications, 
Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance structure (C4ISR) through “closer 
linkages between American and Japanese command, control, and communication (C3) 
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systems.”78 This is being accomplished in large part through the buildup of Japanese missile 
defense as it contributes to the American missile defense system, which includes contingencies 
for the defense of Taiwan.79 In doing so, Japanese installments will allow for a more integrated 
network of communication and intelligence for early warning and tracking.  The 2005 Security 
Consultative Committee Document entitled “U.S.-Japan Alliance-Transformation and 
Realignment for the Future” listed Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) as an essential step to 
strengthen posture for bilateral security and defense cooperation, stating, “to support these BMD 
systems, they emphasized a critical importance of constant information gathering and sharing, as 
well ass maintaining high readiness and interoperability in light of the minimal time available to 
respond to a ballistic missile threat.”80 The report also called for the United States to evaluate the 
potential sites for the new U.S. X-Band radar system, and to “deploy active defenses, such as 
Patriot PAC-3 and Standard Missile (SM-3) to support U.S. treaty commitments.”81 Japan has 
also recently acknowledged that its own Ballistic Missile Defense subsystem will be integrated 
with and serve U.S. national missile defense. 
 In fostering closer relations and joint operability, the U.S. and Japan have collaborated on 
developing and producing the technology necessary for missile defense.  Armitage, in his 
recommendations for security and military cooperation between the two countries, stated, “The 
United States and Japan should consider opportunities for joint development of key systems, 
subsystems, and related technologies for the CG(X), the successor to the Ticonderoga Class 
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Aegis Guided Missile Cruiser.”82 Presently, Japan has taken valuable steps to contribute to 
missile defense by launching six of its own Aegis destroyers which are equipped with U.S.-
designed SM-3 anti-missile systems.83 In addition, Japan has lifted its self-imposed ban on arms 
exports so as to allow for the “transfer of ballistic missile defense technology from Japan to the 
United States.”84 Japan’s commitment to absorbing substantial portions of the cost of these 
systems will become more important as the United States begins to replace older weapons 
systems.  A CRS Report for Congress on the new naval weapons programs makes note of the 
fact that the CG(X) “would be equipped with a more powerful radar that could support missile-
defense operations” but “might be somewhat larger and more expensive to procure.”85 
A final and critical component of the enhanced alliance cooperation deals in large part 
with Japan’s willingness to provide logistical support for U.S. operations within the region.  In a 
1996 joint communiqué from Washington and Tokyo, “Japan guaranteed base access for U.S. 
forces and committed itself to increased logistics and rear-area support roles.”86 The 1997 
revised guidelines expanded Japan’s role even further and called for cooperation in rear area 
support to “include supplies (construction of office, accommodations, etc., inside US facilities, 
provision of material except arms and ammunition), transportation (including land, sea and air 
transport of personnel, materials inside Japan), maintenance of US aircraft, vessels and vehicles, 
provision of medical services, security of US facilities and areas, communication and others 
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(water, electricity, etc).”87 These new provisions were included as part of a changing role for 
Japanese forces that involves them in “the case of any contingency in the defence of not just its 
own territory, but also in ‘areas surrounding it.’”88 
By shifting the nature of collective security to involve geographically important areas that 
affect Japanese security, the United States can expect to secure greater cooperation from Japan in 
coordinating possible Taiwan contingencies.89 The potential for America to rapidly deploy forces 
from Japanese bases in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait is something that has worried 
Chinese leaders and the implementation of a successful TMD system “could reduce China’s 
ability to threaten the island (Taiwan) with ballistic missile attacks, the PLA’s main means of 
coercing Taiwan.”90 Japanese and American leaders, in January of this year, further strengthened 
possible cooperation for a Taiwan contingency by agreeing that Japan would “provide rear 
support for U.S. forces and possibly engage in other activities” which could include “Japanese 
troops conducting rear-area search and rescue for US soldiers, ship inspections and rescue 
operations for overseas Japanese living in the affected areas.”91 
Southeast Asia: 
 An area of strategic importance in this region is Southeast Asia, where the United States 
and China are the two dominant powers.  The U.S. has a distinct advantage because Southeast 
Asia’s maritime environment allows for an American naval dominance, insofar as China does 
not have maritime power projection capability.  That is not to say that China is not actively 
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seeking ways to improve its naval capabilities; in fact, “the Chinese are likely…to pursue an 
activist policy to influence regional developments as well as to acquire the capabilities to project 
military force throughout the region.”92 
As the United States seeks to consolidate its maritime presence in Southeast Asia, it 
benefits from the general acceptance of American forces in the region; “in the post-Cold War 
period, regional uncertainties about the potential dangers attending a rising China have led some 
analysts to conclude that almost all Southeast Asian states (sometimes referred to as Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN) now see the United States as the critical balancing 
force, both in the military and political-economic spheres.”93 
Southeast Asia has become one of the most significant regions in terms of American 
strategic interests.  Both the United States and members of ASEAN have an interest in protecting 
the vital sea lanes that run through Southeast Asia, which could be threatened by China’s 
territorial claims to critical islands on their (the sea lanes’) periphery.  
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At this point in time, China’s limited naval capabilities make this possibility very unlikely, but it 
is no doubt on the minds of the region’s main actors, who welcome American influence to 
preserve the freedom of navigation. 
 
Singapore: 
 In its search for regional actors who are willing to accommodate American interests in 
the region, the United States has been able to consistently rely on Singapore, whose relationship 
“is the most substantial and multifaceted relationship that the United States has with any 
Southeast Asian country.”95 Though the two countries are not formal alliance partners, each has 
come to expect a certain level of cooperation from the other based on two common security 
threats: the short term threat of terrorism in Singapore and the long term potential for regional 
destabilization due to a rising China.  Singapore finds itself in a very hostile neighborhood and 
“the trajectory of militant Islam in the neighboring states of Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines are inextricably linked to the terrorist threat to Singapore.”96 The events of 
September 11 have significantly improved on an already productive relationship between the two 
countries, and though they “still eschew a formal alliance, Singapore is quietly cooperating with 
the United States more closely on key antiterrorism and anti-proliferation issues, including its 
participation in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative aimed at intercepting illegal 
weapons cargoes transported over sea, air, and land.”97 
Following the end of the Cold War and the uncertainty that ensued, Singapore secured a 
continued American presence in the region by signing a Memorandum of Understanding that 
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gave U.S. forces access to Singaporean naval and air facilities.  Two years later, the United 
States ended its use of its naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines after a series of failed 
negotiations regarding American use of and eventual withdrawal from the base; Singapore was 
eager to afford them a new base for this relocation.98 Perhaps the most significant arrangement 
was a 1998 agreement in which Singapore announced that they would fund the construction of a 
deep sea pier to allow for U.S. aircraft carrier access.  The use of existing facilities rather than 
the creation of permanent bases is a new approach to keeping a U.S. presence in the region and 
“consists of a network of bilateral arrangements that facilitate training, exercises ad 
interoperability which, in lieu of permanent bases” and “will permit the US to remain engaged 
and forward deployed in Southeast Asia.”99 In addition to the facilitating of forward deployment, 
Singapore has participated in joint military exercises with the United States including Cobra 
Gold, the annual Thai-U.S. military exercise.100 
The United States continues to improve its defense cooperation with Singapore.  In 
August of 2005, U.S. and British navies carried out anti-Weapons of Mass Destruction exercises 
in the South China Sea, and were assisted by the Singaporean Navy, strengthening America’s 
commitment to helping Singapore deal with their concern over local terrorism.  May 2005 
marked the 11th time that Singapore and U.S. forces conducted joint exercises in the 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) series, “which have served to enhance the 
interoperability of the two armed forces.”  Security in the Malacca Strait is also on the minds of 
regional and U.S. leaders, and U.S Pacific Fleet Commander Gary Roughead publicly 
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commended Singapore (among other nations) for their work in securing this area, as well as 
pledging U.S. support if requested to ensure regional maritime stability.101 
What does this cooperative relationship mean for both Singapore and the United States?  
Clearly, Singapore has a clear interest in maintaining the status quo in the face of both local 
terrorism and a rising China.  Militarily, Singapore has the most advanced and modern forces in 
Southeast Asia due in large part to their trade with the United States, and “because of its relative 
sophistication and significant defense budget, the Singapore armed forces are the only military 
force in Southeast Asia that can interact with the U.S. military meaningfully.”102 This provides a 
unique aspect to the relationship, because the United States can reasonably expect a certain level 
of cooperation from Singapore in an attempt to maintain their [Singapore’s] posture in the 
region.   
 At the same time, Singapore will continue to fulfill American expectations, as seen with 
the construction of the deep sea pier, because they view the United States as both a stabilizer in 
the region and the leading actor in the global war on terrorism.  American policymakers must 
continue to put forward a strong pledge to pursue its interests in the region, as “Singaporean 
defense cooperation is based on the expectation that the United States remains committed to 
maintaining a presence in the region. Should confidence in the U.S. commitment falter, 
Singapore could see no alternative but to accommodate Chinese regional hegemony.”103 
Despite the solid relationship with Singapore, two problems exist that jeopardize the 
ability of the United States to continue its deployment plans in Southeast Asia.  First, the 
bilateral agreements between Singapore and the United States may only go as far as their current 
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levels, and “it is unlikely that Singapore or other ASEAN states would permit the United States 
to stage combat or combat support operations from their territory.”104 Second, the U.S. will find 
that Singapore is not entirely fit to handle the type of forward deployment that they have 
envisioned for the near future. Though recent improvements to their port facilities have aided 
American naval activity in the region, the reality is that “while welcome as an affirmation of the 
value to the region of the U.S. military presence, Singapore is simply too small a venue to be 
other than place, not a base for U.S. forward deployments.”105 
Philippines: 
 The Philippines is one of five countries in East/Southeast Asia that has a treaty alliance 
with the United States.  After the 1991 withdrawal of American forces from bases in the 
Philippines, the relationship cooled, only to be re-invigorated with the emerging threat of global 
terror.  The two governments now “share concerns over growing evidence of links between 
Philippine and international terrorist organizations” and the U.S. “is providing security assistance 
to enhance the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to counter terrorism.”106 A 
November 2001 joint statement following a trip by Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to Washington re-affirmed the commitment of the United States to improve Philippine 
security forces through an aid package that “would include a robust training package, equipment 
needed for increased mobility, a maintenance program to enhance overall capabilities, specific 
targeted law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation, and a new bilateral defense 
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consultative mechanism.”107 As part of this assistance, American troops are undertaking joint 
civic projects (i.e. building roads, repairing schools) to combat the grass-roots support for Al 
Qaida as well as conducting joint military exercises to improve bilateral interoperability for 
counterterrorism operations.108 
In 1991, heated negotiations over the use of the naval base at Subic Bay by the U.S. Navy 
and the subsequent Pinatubo volcanic eruption (which rendered the base temporarily unusable 
and expensive to restore) led to an American withdrawal from the Philippines.  In 1995, the U.S. 
made no efforts to deter Chinese occupation of a reef located within 150 miles of the Philippines; 
though the State Department did issue a statement denouncing the threat or use of military force 
to assert territorial claims in the area.  Chinese actions subsequently opened the eyes of the 
Philippine government to the necessity of establishing stronger ties with the U.S., and the United 
States now benefits from the Philippine perspective on the rise of China, especially concerning 
territorial claims in the South China Sea.  These developments contributed to the 1998 RP-U.S. 
Visiting Forces Agreement, which “was a major step in the reconstruction of the U.S.-Philippine 
defense relationship and, from Manila’s standpoint, of reestablishing deterrence in the region.”109 
The United States and the Philippines have improved upon their defense cooperation in 
recent years.  Both U.S. and Philippine naval forces partook in a joint counterterrorism exercise 
in August of 2005.  In May of 2006, Roughead announced the staging of joint training exercise 
with the Philippine Navy and Marines to better prepare them for advances military exercises, and 
noted that, “We have many activities in the Pacific Fleet that are focused on operating with our 
friends and partners in the region.”  The United States, as the global leader in the war on terror, 
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has used this to their advantage in improving relations in Southeast Asia, and in August of 2006, 
the U.S. and the Philippines conducted bilateral naval exercises (CARAT) aimed at the 
combating of terrorism, with provisions to expand the training exercise to communication, 
command and control, and diving and salvage routines.110 The exercises, conducted to enhance 
regional cooperation primarily aimed at terrorism and transnational crimes in the sea lanes, by 
their very nature and location, allow the United States and its regional allies to contain China in 
the South China Sea without specifically carrying out contingency plans for possible disputes 
over the Spratly Islands. 
 Philippine military leaders are pleased with the overall progress made by the two nations.  
Owen Cortez, a Philippine task force leader for the joint exercises noted that, “it was a very 
successful event for us and the US navy contingent because we're able to attain our objectives in 
improving our command and control tactics, logistics procedure, and our maritime security 
capabilities.”  The United States also seeks to improve the ability of regional forces to better 
serve American interests, as a report on the bilateral exercises noted, stating, “The series of drills 
and simulation activities are expected to strengthen the Philippine navy's capability to contribute 
to the internal security and counter-terrorism operations.”111 
Although the Philippines has refused to re-instate basing privileges for U.S. forces 
following the 1991 closure of the U.S. base at Subic Bay, defense cooperation has been enhanced 
in other ways.  The Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) has improved defense cooperation and “is 
a key bilateral instrument for keeping Washington engaged, for building a stronger alliance, and 
for enhancing the capabilities of the AFP.  Philippine leaders have also visited the United States 
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to affirm their commitment to strengthening bilateral ties between the nations, including joint 
exercises and American assistance for the modernization of the AFP.112 
What then does the future hold for the U.S.-Philippine defense relationship?  With an eye 
towards China, the U.S. must continue to foster improving relations with the Philippines, which 
could provide valuable basing for air superiority over the sea-lanes of the South China Sea.  If 
China pursues a more hostile course of action towards its ASEAN neighbors, the United States 
could look to the Philippines, as well as Singapore, to lead a regional military cooperation effort 
with the U.S.113 
Malaysia: 
 The United States has also found a strategic partner in Southeast Asia in Malaysia.  
During the current Operation Enduring Freedom, Malaysia, among other countries, has 
“contributed support ranging from over flight, access and basing to escort, 
logistics, and troops on the ground.”114 However, in terms of dealing with the rise of China, the 
U.S. has found that Malaysia is not as reliable as Singapore.  Though many in the Malaysian 
military establishment remain cautious of China’s intentions, “some security analysts in the 
region believe that Malaysia has decided to accommodate China on South China Sea issues and 
is emulating Chinese tactics vis-à-vis the Philippines.”115 The rise of Chinese economic power 
in the region has influenced the way Malaysia views their relationship with China, and in turn, 
the United States.  Sokolsky, Rabasa, and Neu have noted that “particularly with Malaysia and 
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Indonesia—both of which are committed to national and regional ‘self-reliance’ and are sensitive 
about their sovereignty and position within the Non-Aligned Movement—the United States will 
need to be patient in building trust in the relationship and in improving their defense 
capabilities.”116 In doing so, they must deal with the inevitability of anti-West sentiment and the 
realization that cooperation with China by regional actors will only help to enforce their regional 
identity and values. 
 Defense cooperation with Malaysia continues to improve the relationship between the 
two nations and allows each country to achieve its own goals in the region.  In May of 2006, the 
U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander visited Malaysia to discuss American cooperation and the overall 
stability of the region.  The U.S. and Malaysia also carry out CARAT exercises aimed at 
advancing American interests in the region as well as allowing Malaysian forces to gain more 
experience in these situations.117 In addition, American aircraft carriers, including the nuclear 
powered USS Enterprise have made port calls in Malaysia, and “[U.S.] ship visits and exercises 
in Malaysia, which have gradually increased, have become an important component of our 
Southeast Asian presence.”118 
Prior to the retirement of Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, an outspoken critic of 
many U.S. policies, the amount of cooperation that could be expected out of Kuala Lumpur was 
often unclear.  In a 2001 RAND report on the changing environment in Southeast Asia, Angel 
Rabasa noted that “Malaysia hosts regular bilateral exercises with the USAF, but operational use 
of Malaysian facilities for regional contingencies is unlikely unless Malaysian security was 
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threatened.”119 Mahathir’s exit from office has alleviated some concerns that Malaysia could not 
play a role in American forward deployment.  Military officials continue to include Malaysia in 
their force relocation plans that would “shift some troops from their long-standing major bases in 
Japan and Korea and to establish smaller bases in such countries as Australia, Singapore, or 
Malaysia.”120 
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Part IV: Tensions in Regional Alliances 
America’s military transformation, while fostering stronger ties in the region, has also 
contributed to weakening U.S. relations with historical allies, most notably South Korea and 
Australia.  Increasing demands on these countries to accommodate the United States on security 
issues directly involving regional stability has raised questions concerning the future of these 
alliances.  While both alliances still have the potential to strategically benefit each country, the 
parties involved will have to reconcile differences that have materially affected the structure of 
each relationship.  Ultimately, however, the attenuation of these alliances will inevitably affect 
U.S. ability to maximize its rapid deployment capability in East Asia.   
 
South Korea: 
 Since the end of the Korean Conflict in 1953, the United States and South Korea 
(ROK) have been strong allies in East Asia, with U.S. troops permanently stationed as a “trip-
wire” between the north and the South.  The relationship remained strong throughout the Cold 
War in the face of a common Soviet threat, and continued thereafter in response to North 
Korea’s aggressive procurement of nuclear weapons.  The rise of China, however, and diverging 
American and South Korean views on the response to it has forced policymakers on both sides of 
the alliance to question future utility of the alliance. 
The changing nature of the security relationship between the United States and South 
Korea can be attributed in part to a series of shifts on the domestic front in the ROK.  Growing 
anti-American sentiment, a result of increased democratization in Korean society, has created an 
atmosphere in which it is now more tolerable to openly criticize U.S. polices concerning the 
south.  At the same time, Korean society is undergoing a resurgence of nationalism, both in the 
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way the ROK asserts itself towards the United States and in the way they identify with North 
Koreans.121 
International factors have also contributed to the changes in the US-South Korean 
alliance.  Since 2002, “China has become the dominant source of economic growth for South 
Korea.”122 China is now the leading target of foreign direct investment from South Korea, 
occupying the distinction once held by the United States.  In addition, South Korean annual 
exports to China increased almost 50 percent between 2001 and 2003, making China the largest 
export market for South Korea.123 The China-ROK relationship is now the strongest in the 
region, as “a kind of ‘China fever’ has swept across South Korea, or at least the business 
community.”124 These changes in China-South Korean relations have contributed to the 
reorientation of South Korean foreign policy. 
 The U.S.-ROK alliance, predicated on the defense of South Korea and the ability to use 
the peninsula to position forces for regional stability (i.e. deter China), may now be destined for 
failure. Perhaps the greatest source of tension in the alliance stems from South Korea’s 
willingness to abandon a hard-line stance toward North Korea.  In the past, North Korea’s 
aggressive ambitions served as a common threat that united the security interests of both the 
United States and South Korea.  But the Bush administration’s inclusion of North Korea in the 
“axis of evil” comes at a time when South Koreans have “the image of North Korea as a nation 
of the same race…while the perception of the North as an enemy state has weakened.”  Indeed, 
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“many Koreans now view North Korea as having neither the willingness nor the capacity to 
wage a war against the South.”125 As the South Korean leadership continues to put forth a 
Sunshine Policy towards the North, American military leaders have begun to restructure United 
States Forces in South Korea (USFK), placing a larger burden on the ROK to provide for their 
own defense.   
 The strain on the alliance produced by the rise of China and America’s current plans for 
military transformation has dealt the U.S. a setback in organizing and maintaining its presence in 
East Asia.  An indication of this is the declining levels of security cooperation as “South Korean 
accommodation of the rise of China is also reflected in Seoul’s resistance to post-cold war 
defense cooperation with the United States.”126 United States efforts to implement a rapid 
response model for its forces has challenged South Korea’s understanding of its national interest.  
A 2006 agreement on joint flexibility, while speaking with a degree of general optimism, stated 
that “In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it 
shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean 
people.”127 Though not specifically mentioning the pressing issue of the day, the statement 
reflects South Korean unwillingness to allow the use of U.S. forces in their country to be used 
for conflicts that involve China, namely any intervention in the Taiwan Strait. 
 United States forces in South Korea are now being withdrawn and restructured to serve 
the greater American goal of regional stability.  Though the initial redeployment of USFK was 
intended to bolster the war effort in Iraq, the restructuring of forces reflects U.S. recognition of 
the diminished utility of its forces in South Korea for the transformation that is currently 
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underway in the U.S. military.128 The United States clearly intends for its forces in East Asia to 
deter China from expanding its influence in the region, and Korea’s unwillingness to 
accommodate U.S. changes and hard-line stance towards the North has forced policymakers to 
look elsewhere for cooperative alliance partners. 
 If the United States wants to transform its military and expect countries to cooperate, then 
it must continue to show that it is committed to maintaining stability in the region.  Korea 
presents an obstacle to accomplishing this goal by contesting American efforts to firmly establish 
itself on the mainland.  Although some argue that if salvaged, “the U.S.-ROK alliance will 
continue to serve as a bedrock for America’s commitment in the region,”129 this is an optimistic 
view on the current situation, insofar as the United States is strengthening its alliances with other 
regional actors to compensate for a dwindling relationship with South Korea.  In implementing 
the goals of military transformation with regards to USFK, the U.S. would not only have to be 
able to base rapidly deployable brigades in Korea, but it would also have to retain the joint 
command structure that integrates Korean forces with American forces.  But South Korea has 
shown resistance to maintain U.S. joint command of allied forces.  President Roh Moo-hyun, 
“wishes to destroy its (the alliance’s) time tested dynamics by wrestling away from the United 
States wartime operational control of the two countries’ armed forces, the result of which will be 
the complete and virtually irreversible dismantlement of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces 
Command (CFC).”130 
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As South Korea becomes more dependent on China for economic growth and less willing 
to accommodate the United States on North Korea, it will become more reluctant to cooperate 
with the United States on issues regarding military transformation and policies aimed at regional 
stability. In addition, the proximity of South Korea to China and the apparent necessity to 
accommodate GROWING Chinese strategic power makes it unlikely that Korean leaders will 
allow their country to be used for U.S. led operations aimed at the Chinese.  Further, they may 
still be counted on even less to act independent of American control as a rear area responsible for 
logistical support, which in turn means that they may be completely left out of contingency 
planning for regional conflict.   
 
Australia: 
The United States-Australia strategic alliance, embodied in the Security Treaty between 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS), has historically been one of 
America’s most stable relationships in the Asia-Pacific region and the world.131 As one of the 
original democracies in the region, Australia has consistently been aligned in its values with the 
U.S., and “over the past century the two countries have fought together in five wars and began 
the new century as allies in the war on terrorism.”132 On the issues of terrorism, including 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the emergence of failed states, Australia has 
allowed the United States, as the great power in the alliance, to take the lead.  Though there has 
been little domestic resistance to America’s dominance of the alliance, the question of a rising 
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China and how the U.S. plans to deal with it has become a cause for concern in Australian 
politics. 
 The general structure of the U.S.-Australia relationship has been centered on extended 
nuclear deterrence and a security guarantee from Washington.  While Australia technically is 
responsible for its own self-defense within the region, such a posture “is immeasurably 
strengthened by highly privileged access to U.S. intelligence, defense science, weapons, and 
military logistics support.” In terms of weaponry, Australia purchases a majority of their high-
technology weapons systems from the U.S., as well as equipping their air force and navy with 
the latest in U.S. aircraft and combat systems.  At the same time, Australia is committed to 
improving the interoperability of its forces with American forces and has shown little resistance 
to hosting U.S. forces, including nuclear powered and capable warships. 
 The alliance is not completely one-sided however.  Australia has been willing to be 
proactive in regional affairs.  It was quick to invoke the ANZUS treaty following September 11 
and “provided combat troops in Afghanistan and Iraq” while helping to foster “antiterrorist 
cooperation agreements with counties in the region, especially Southeast Asia.”  Even more, 
Australia has the ability to contribute capabilities “that are in short supply in the U.S. military 
inventory, such as air refueling tankers, special forces, certain types of electronic surveillance 
and intelligence, conventional submarines, and, in the future, highly capable early warning 
aircraft.”133 
Despite intense cooperation and mutual reliability, the alliance has shown potential signs 
of tension concerning the rise of China.  The United States continues to be welcomed as a 
regional stabilizer, but as is the case with South Korea, China has displaced the United States as 
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the leading economic partner with Australia, with China becoming the “second most popular 
source of Australian imports and second most popular destination of Australian exports.”134 
Therefore, “Australia values a U.S. forward role that contributes to the regional balance but 
tolerates the rise of China by seeking to incorporate it into mainstream international economic 
and security systems” and “opposes any American efforts to define its Asian purpose as the 
‘containment’ of China.”135 As the American military transforms and repositions its forces in the 
region with a clear eye toward deterring, and to some extent, containing China, the question 
arises as to what level of resistance Australia will demonstrate toward accommodating U.S. 
demands. Australian forces are not structured to actively participate in war-fighting situations in 
Northeast Asia, which may relegate them to operating as a rear support area.   
 The most notable and likely cause for concern in Australia is a possible crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait, which would draw the United States into conflict with China and jeopardize the 
economic and strategic relations that Australia has with both countries.  Australia has made it 
quite clear that it will not contribute to American operations against China over Taiwan, the core 
U.S., strategic concern regarding China, despite its willingness to accommodate U.S. missile 
defense instillations on its soil.  Alexander Downer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, has assured 
Chinese leaders of this, stating, “I think they increasingly understand this isn’t directed at China, 
or isn’t designed to intervene in the China-Taiwan issue—which  is of course their great area of 
sensitivity.”136 
134 Dan Blumenthal, “The Impact of China’s Economic Growth on North and Southeast Asia,” U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commision, Washington DC, July 22, 2005. 
135 Kelly, “Australian for Alliance.” 
136 William T. Tow, “Sino-American Relations and the 'Australian factor': Inflated Expectations or Discriminate 
Engagement?”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 4, p. 461. 
 
48
The U.S.-Australia alliance, while exhibiting signs of tension over views of the rise of 
China and a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait, is less at risk (compared to South Korea) of 
failure as the U.S. transforms its military.  American demands of Australia are significantly less 
than those made of allies in closer proximity to China (i.e. South Korea) and the U.S. could 
benefit from the realization that Australia is a firm alliance partner in a strategic location for 
positioning just outside the region.  If Washington is willing to come to a better understanding of 
Australian concerns in the relationship, they will find that they still have a willing partner that 
strongly advocates an American presence in Asia.  At the same time, the U.S. can benefit greatly 
from stronger trilateral relations that include both Japan and Australia, compensating for the loss 
of South Korea as a strategic ally.  Even as the U.S. continues to transform its military with a 
view towards China, American policymakers must understand that “U.S.-China relations must 
remain benign if trilateral security cooperation is to be a factor for strategic reassurance rather 
than a stimulus of regional destabilization.”137 Furthermore, Australia is less significant in terms 
of overall transformation, as opposed to South Korea or Japan, and so American leaders should 
not be so quick to condemn Australia for its determination to maintain regional stability through 
cordial relations with both the U.S. and China. 
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Part V: Conclusion 
 The United States military footprint in East Asia is undergoing a fundamental change in 
response to the rise of China, due to the transformation of American forces and war-fighting 
strategies.  As the U.S. increases its role in global security, its forces will be called into action in 
various parts of the world, and not always at different times.  With appropriate forward 
deployments and cooperation from allies, the move to a rapidly deployable force will allow the 
United States to virtually go anywhere at any time.  With an eye on a rising China and the 
potential for destabilization in East Asia, the United States has thus restructured its forces and 
alliances in the region.  There is much uncertainty concerning the direction that Chinese leaders 
will take as their country becomes a great power, and this is a troubling issue for both the United 
States and China’s neighbors, who have traditionally been American allies.  By increasing their 
presence in the region, the United States has shown a commitment to maintaining the status quo 
in East Asia as well as given a clear indication to China that it will not tolerate aggressive action 
towards its alliance partners. 
 This transformation has not been without its challenges, as the demands of America’s 
new capabilities have put a strain on many of its alliances.  In the case of Japan, Singapore, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines, the United States has found allies that are willing to accommodate 
the transformation and provide the U.S. with access to bases, logistical support, and rear area 
support.  The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance is especially important, as this security 
relationship has been America’s greatest strategic asset in the region; greater cooperation in the 
South China Sea has allowed both the U.S. and its allies to contain aggressive Chinese intentions 
concerning territorial claims that could affect strategic choke points and shipping lanes.  To 
accomplish these goals, the United States has combined its unilateral deployments and increased 
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coordination with its allies to enhance both their capabilities and the preparedness for 
contingencies involving conflict with China. 
 The change in America’s footprint in East Asia can also be seen in the way the U.S. has 
had to compensate for the loss of traditional alliance partners.  China’s increasing economic 
stature in the region has caused both South Korea and Australia to question their alliance with 
the United States, especially now that U.S. military transformation has called for greater 
cooperation from these partners.  With the loss of South Korea as a strategic partner in close 
proximity to China, American leaders have worked to bring the country closer with the allies 
already discussed.  In this way, the U.S. footprint not only changes in nature and structure, but 
also in location within the region.  Troop realignment away from South Korea and the general 
inability to use the peninsula to serve American strategic interests has forced U.S. leaders to look 
elsewhere for access and cooperation.  Australia, a traditionally strong ally has not been one of 
these countries willing to cooperate, and its increasingly strong ties to China have created a 
“potential area of future tension should the US and China have a major disagreement, 
particularly over Taiwan.”138 In the aforementioned allies (Japan and the ASEAN states), they 
have found willing participants who will support America’s transformation to rapid deployment 
and continued stabilization of the region.  In the near future, the U.S. will have to continue to 
closely monitor these alliances to meet the expectations of each of its allies while seeking to 
enhance their capabilities and those of each alliance as they deal with a rising China. 
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